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TOO GOOD, TOO BAD: "OVERQUALIFIED" 

OLDER WORKERS 
JEFF MORNEAU* 
INTRODUCTION 
Increasingly in today's market, employers are rejecting older 
"overqualified" applicants for jobs that they appear to be able to 
perform. Even though the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
{"ADEA")l protects older applicants from discrimination based on 
age, an employer may be able to reject an older applicant if it be­
lieves the applicant is overqualified and therefore likely to become 
bored or transfer to a different job. Such an action by an employer 
can create problems by leaving older workers without a job and 
without any remedy for an adverse employment action taken, at 
least arguably, because of their age. Suppose, for example, the fol­
lowing situation: 
John Martin is fifty-five years old and has been a school su­
perintendent for the past three years. As superintendent he 
turned the school district from one of the worst in the state into 
one of the best. Previously, he was a principal at a public high 
school in the same school district and was regarded as one of the 
best ever to lead the public high school. Besides being an excel­
lent superintendent and principal, he taught for over fifteen years 
at a private high school that only accepted the brightest students 
from the community. Furthermore, he had graduate degrees in 
English and School Administration from a prestigious university. 
After his term as superintendent, John decided he wanted to go 
back to teaching. 
* Associate with the law firm of Bulkley, Richardson & Gelinas, LLP, Spring­
field, Massachusetts; LL.M, 1999, Georgetown University (labor and employment); 
J.D., 1998, Western New England College School of Law. 
1. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,29 U.S.c. §§ 621-633a (1994). 
The statute provides: 
It shall be unlawful for an employer. .. to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge 
any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to 
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
such individual's age. 
[d. § 623(a)(1). 
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John applied for many different types of entry-level teaching 
jobs because no lateral positions were available. He applied to 
teach at an elementary school in a large city. Despite the availa­
bility of a position and his apparent qualifications, the school 
board rejected John because it thought that he would be bored, 
unchallenged, and uninterested in teaching children from the in­
ner city after making policy decisions and being involved in vari­
ous administrations. Furthermore, the school board thought that 
after he realized how difficult the students were, John would seek 
alternative employment. Therefore, he was not hired. 
John also applied to teach at a middle school. This school 
board did not hire John either. The board reasoned that as a 
former superintendent he would attempt to control the adminis­
tration of the school as well as his classroom. Furthermore, the 
school board reasoned that the academic program would not of­
fer him the challenge and sophistication that a person of his 
background would want, and believed he was better suited to 
teach at a private school or remain a school administrator. The 
middle school's board also thought that once John realized how 
boring and simple classes were, he would quit. 
Does this sound reasonable? Well, for reasons remarkably 
similar to these, employers are rejecting older job applicants. Re­
jection of older applicants based on their "overqualification" has 
become a serious problem, in part, because Americans are living 
longer than ever before.2 As baby boomers move into their fifties, 
it is not surprising that a large part of America's workforce is ag­
ing.3 The effect that the growing population of older adults will 
have on the workforce is still unclear. However, older workers may 
feel less secure as to their future in their jobs. This sense of insecu­
2. See generally RESOURCE SERVS. GROUP, ET AL., A PROFILE OF OLDER AMERI­
CANS: 1997 (1997). "The older population-persons 65 years or older-numbered 33.9 
million in 1996. They represented 12.8% of the U.S. population, about one in every 
eight Americans. The number of older Americans increased by 2.6 million or 8% since 
1990, compared to an increase of 6% for the under-65 population." Id. at 1. Since 1900, 
the percentage of Americans 65 and over has more than tripled (4.1 % in 1900 to 12.8% 
in 1996), and the number has increased nearly eleven times (from 3.1 million to 33.9 
million). See id. "The older population itself is getting older. In 1996 the 65-74 age 
group (18.7 million) was eight times larger than in 1900, but the 75-84 group (11.4 mil­
lion) was 16 times larger and the 85+ group (3.8 million) was 31 times larger." Id. "By 
2030, there will be about 70 million older persons, more than twice their number in 
1996. People 65+ are projected to represent almost 13% of the population in the year 
2000 but will be 20% by 2030." Id. at 2. 
3. See BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, OLDER AMERICANS IN THE WORKFORCE: 
CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS 6 (1987) (stating that in 1986, persons age 40 and above 
composed 37.8% of the workforce; by 2010, people age 40 and older are expected to 
comprise nearly half of the workforce). 
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rity is not unfounded. Recently, declining profitability has led 
many companies to cut costS.4 Often this is accomplished by mak­
ing large-scale reductions in workforces, or downsizing.5 Downsiz­
ing is most often achieved by thinning out the ranks of middle 
management, using automation, and by establishing incentives for 
early retirement.6 Whichever method is used, a disproportionately 
large number of older workers are displaced.7 
Unemployment can have devastating consequences to older 
workers whether due to a reduction in force, age discrimination, or 
any other reason.S Those who are newly unemployed are con­
fronted with the prospects of finding a new job and stabilizing their 
lives often after many years in the same position with the same em­
ployer. These older workers may seek re-employment, but are 
4. See generally AARP, AMERICAN BUSINESS AND OLDER WORKERS: A ROAD 
MAp TO THE 21ST CENTURY (1995) (discussing trends within the business workplace 
affecting older employees). 
5. According to the Labor Department's Bureau of Labor Statistics, in the third 
quarter of 1999 there were 1099 mass lay-off actions by employers that involved 242, 
289 workers. See Bureau of Labor Statistics (visited Apr. 8, 2000)<http://stats.bls.gov! 
news.release!mslo.toc.htm>. Therefore, despite the current booming economy, mass re­
ductions in force ("RIFs") continue to be commonplace. See generally Bureau of Labor 
Statistics News Releases website (visited Apr. 8, 2000) <http://stats.bls.gov!new­
srels.htm> (providing current national statistics regarding mass reductions); see also 
COMMISSION ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE ELDERLY, ABA, DOWNSIZING IN AN AG­
ING WORK FORCE: THE LAW, THE LIMrrs, AND THE LESSONS 6 n. 9 (1992) [hereinafter 
DOWNSIZING IN AN AGING WORK FORCE]. An American Management Association 
("AMA") survey in July 1987 found that of 1,134 companies that responded, 45% had 
undergone significant RIFs between January 1986 and June 1987. See id. "A later 
AMA survey conducted in 1989 showed that in the preceding year, 39% of the 1,084 
companies and nonprofit organizations surveyed by the AMA reduced their 
workforces, cutting an average of 162 employees." Id. 
6. See DOWNSIZING IN AN AGING WORKFORCE, supra note 5, at 2-4. 
7. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 5 (noting the large number of work­
ers layed off in 1999). 
8. See National Senior Citizens Law Ctr., Untender Mercies: Layoffand the Older 
Worker, 22 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1104, 1104 (1989) (finding that nearly one million 
workers over the age of 55 lost their jobs because of plant closings or employment 
cutbacks between 1981 and 1985). One-half of these workers were displaced from the 
jobs they had held for 15 years or more; less than half were re-employed. See id; see 
also U.S. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, AGING AMERICA: TRENDS AND PROJEC­
TIONS, S. REp. No. 101-249, vol. 2, at 93 (1989) [hereinafter SPEOAL COMM. ON AGING] 
(finding that older workers endure greater earnings loss in subsequent jobs than do 
younger workers and are more likely to give up looking for another job altogether); 
Tamar Lewin, When or Whether to Retire: New Ways to Handle Strain, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 22, 1990, at Al (according to Commonwealth Fund Senior Vice President Thomas 
Moloney, "[o]f the older people who are out of the workforce, half are satisfied, a quar­
ter can't work because of their health or family situations, and the other quarter are 
very unhappy about the situation they're in.... That quarter represents about two 
million people ..."). 
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often forced to apply for entry-level (and therefore lower wage) 
jobs because they lack the training necessary for the higher paying 
jobs in different industries or because middle or upper-management 
positions are not available. Yet, older workers are even prevented 
from attaining lower level positions when employment recruiters 
reject them on the basis that they are overqualified.9 
"Overqualification" is a sUbjective quality that cannot be mea­
sured accurately through a standardized test. Thus, when supervi­
sors reject older applicants because they are overqualified, there is 
a real danger that the supervisors are in fact acting with discrimina­
tory intent, or at a minimum, are basing an employment decision on 
subconscious stereotypes and prejudices. Because of this danger 
and its potential effect on older workers, it is important to consider 
whether "overqualification" should be considered a legitimate rea­
son not to hire an applicant. This Article will examine the differ­
ences in three circuit court opinions that have considered the use of 
"overqualification" by employers as a reason to reject older 
applicants. 
The Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have addressed the issue 
of "overqualification" within the context of the ADEA in the hiring 
process. In Taggart v. Time, Inc., 10 the Second Circuit held that re­
jecting older applicants based on "overqualification" can be a mask 
for age discrimination, and is therefore not a legitimate reason for 
rejection. l1 Conversely, the Sixth Circuit in Stein v. National City 
Bank12 and the Ninth Circuit in EEOC v. Insurance Co. of North 
America13 held that although rejecting applicants based on "over­
qualification" grounds may at times be a mask for age discrimina­
tion, it also may be a legitimate reason to reject applicants.14 
Part I of this Article addresses the origin and development of 
the ADEA and discusses the elements necessary for a plaintiff to 
9. See generally Toni J. Querry, Note, A Rose by Any Other Name No Longer 
Smells as Sweet: Disparate Treatment Discrimination and the Age Proxy Doctrine After 
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 530, 539-40 & n.71 (1996) (discussing 
the age proxy doctrine and how using overqualifcation is an impermissible proxy for 
age in the employment context). 
10. 924 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1991). 
11. See id. at 48. See infra Part II.A for a discussion of Taggart. 
12. 942 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1991). See infra Part II.B for a discussion of Stein. 
13. 49 F.3d 1418 (9th Cir. 1995). See infra Part II.C for a discussion of Insurance 
Co. of N. Am. 
14. See Insurance Co. of N. Am., 49 F.3d at 1421 (stating that "reliance on 'over­
qualification' as a disqualifying factor in hiring can easily mask age discrimination when 
'overqualified' is not defined"); Stein, 942 F.2d at 1066. 
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establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADEA. 
Part II examines the opinions rendered in Taggart v. Time, Inc., 
Stein v. National City Bank, and EEOC v. Insurance Co. of North 
America. Part III of this Article identifies types of objective and 
subjective evidence used in discrimination cases, analyzes the use of 
"overqualification" by employers to establish a legitimate nondis­
criminatory reason for an adverse employment decision, and criti­
ques the Ninth Circuit's decision in EEOC v. Insurance Co. of 
North America. Part III further provides a framework for how em­
ployers should handle overqualified applicants that they do not 
wish to hire so as to limit their potential liability under the ADEA. 
I. BACKGROUND 
When Congress passed Title VIps in 1964 to protect minorities 
from discrimination in the workplace, it declined to pass legislation 
that would protect older Americans from discrimination based 
upon age.16 However, aware that age discrimination might be a 
problem, Congress did require the Secretary of Labor to undertake 
a study of age discrimination in section 715 of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964.17 The study ultimately revealed that age discrimination 
was a problem for American workers and that it had an adverse 
effect on the ability of older workers to find and retain employ­
menUs It was from this report that the ADEA was born. 
15. 42 u.s.c. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994). Section 2000e-(2)(a)(I) provides that 
it is "an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ­
ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id. 
16. See Brendan Sweeney, Comment, "Downsizing" the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act: The Availability ofDisparate Impact Liability, 41 VILL. L. REv. 1527, 
1539 nn.40-41 (1996); Carol E.B. McKenny, Enforcement ofAge Discrimination in Em­
ployment Legislation, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1157, 1158 (1981). Prior to the ADEA, age 
discrimination claims could only be brought in the few states that had enacted laws 
prohibiting such discrimination. See 2 MERRICK T. ROSSEIN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMI­
NATION: LAW AND LITIGATION § 22.1(2) (1990). Employees of the federal government, 
who were not protected by state law, had to bring age discrimination claims under 
either the equal protection or due process clause of the U.S. Constitution. See id. While 
government workers were not originally protected under the ADEA, the Act was 
amended in 1974 to protect them as well. See MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DIS­
CRIMINATION LAW § 6.01(b), at 506-07 (1988). 
17. See 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-14 (1994); see also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, RE· 
PORT TO THE CONGRESS ON AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT UNDER SECTION 
715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1965) [hereinafter REpORT TO CONGRESS]. 
18. See REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 17. Although the study determined 
that there was "no evidence of prejudice based on dislike or intolerance for the older 
worker," the evidence did indicate that organizations discriminated on the basis of age. 
See id. Furthermore, the study determined that discrimination was a result of errone­
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A. History and Scope of the ADEA 
Four years later, in 1967, Congress passed the ADEA to pro­
tect older Americans from discrimination in the workplace.19 The 
asserted goal of the ADEA is to "promote employment of older 
persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary 
age discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers and 
workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of 
age on employment."2o As originally enacted, the ADEA only pro­
tected individuals working in the private sector between the ages of 
forty and sixty-five.21 Since then, however, the reach of the Act has 
expanded to protect a greater number of employees.22 Currently, 
the ADEA protects employees23 age forty or older from being dis­
criminated against by an employer24 on account of their age. The 
employee is protected regardless of whether the discrimination oc­
curs in terms of hiring, discharging, compensation, or any other 
conditions of employment.25 
ous assumptions employers had adopted concerning the effects of age on economic effi­
ciency in the workplace. See id.; see also SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, supra note 8, at 75 
(recognizing that once persons age 55-64 lose their jobs, they suffer the longest duration 
of unemployment of any group in the country). 
19. See ADEA, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 
U.S.c. §§ 621-634 (1994»; see also ROSSEIN, supra note 16, §22.1(2) (stating that prior 
to the ADEA, age discrimination claims could only be brought in the few states that 
had enacted laws prohibiting such discrimination). 
20. 29 U.S.c. § 621(b) (1994); see also Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 
610 (1993) ("Congress' promulgation of the ADEA was prompted by its concern that 
older workers were being deprived of employment on the basis of inaccurate and stig­
matizing stereotypes."). Congress found that older persons "find themselves disadvan­
taged in their efforts to retain employment, and especially to regain employment when 
displaced from jobs." 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(I) (1994). 
21. See PLAYER, supra note 16, § 6.01(b), at 507. 
22. In 1974, the ADEA was amended to expand coverage to federal, state, and 
local government employees. See PLAYER, supra note 16, § 6.01(b), at 507. In 1978, the 
ADEA was amended to extend coverage to individuals up to the age of 70. See id. 
§ 6.01(c), at 507. In 1986, Congress expanded coverage to any individual over the age 
of 40. See id. § 6.01(e), at 508. 
23. See 29 U.S.c. § 630(f) (1994) (stating that an employee under the ADEA is 
"an individual employed by any employer"). The term employee also encompasses 
U.S. citizens employed overseas by U.S. corporations or their subsidiaries. See id. 
§ 630(f)(1). 
24. See id. § 630(b). In order for an employer to be considered subject to the 
ADEA, the employer must be a "person engaged in an industry affecting commerce" 
who has 20 or more employees each day for at least 20 calendar weeks of either "the 
current or preceding calendar year." Id. The ADEA also provides that the term em­
ployer includes all private sector organizations which employ at least twenty people, all 
state and local governments, and any agent of such persons or organizations. See id. 
§ 630(a)-(b). 
25. See id. § 623(a). See supra note 1 for the text of § 623(a)(I). 
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The ADEA covers many, but not all, employer-employee rela­
tionships. For example, the ADEA does not cover uniformed per­
sonnel in the active or reserve armed forces.26 Also, true 
independent contractors are not protected by the ADEA because 
they are not considered "employees" of covered employers.27 In 
addition, a number of affirmative defenses are available to defend­
ants in ADEA cases. For example, an employment decision based 
on a reasonable factor other than age or good cause is lawful.28 A 
bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ") is a defense that ac­
knowledges that age may be used as a criterion in an employment 
practice or policy, but only if the use of age is "reasonably neces­
sary to the normal operation of the particular business."29 In addi­
tion, a bona fide employee benefit plan and a bona fide seniority 
system which "is not intended to evade the purposes of [the 
ADEA]" are also affirmative defenses.3o A release that meets the 
standards set by the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act 
("OWBPA") is another defense.31 A good faith effort to conform 
with, or in reliance on, a written interpretation of the EEOC guide­
lines is also a defense.32 Still, as a preliminary matter, a claimant 
26. See Spain v. Ball, 928 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1991) (per curiam); Kawitt v. United 
States, 842 F.2d 951, 953-54 (7th Cir. 1988); Helm v. California, 722 F.2d 507, 509 (9th 
Cir. 1983). 
27. See 29 U.S.c. § 630(f) (1994). Indian tribes are also exempt from the defini­
tion of employer. See, e.g., EEOC v. Fond du Lac Heavy Equip. & Constr. Co., 986 
F.2d 246, 249 (8th Cir. 1993). 
28. See 29 U.S.c. § 623(f)(1) & (3) (1994). 
29. See id. § 623(f)(1); see also Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 
407 (1985) (holding that a BFOQ defense is available only if the BFOQ is reasonably 
necessary to the normal operation or essence of the defendant's business). Compare 
Coupe v. Federal Express Corp., 121 F.3d 1022, 1023 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 
S.Ct. 1300 (1998) (noting that the Federal Aviation Administration's rule prohibiting 
employment of pilots over age 60 was a valid BFOQ), and Murnane v. American Air­
lines, Inc., 667 F.2d 98, 100-01 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding that the practice of only hiring 
pilots under the age of 40 is a BFOQ because the age requirement was "reasonably 
necessary to the normal operation of the airline"), and Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, 
Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 238 (5th Cir. 1976) (finding the employer bus company did establish 
a BFOQ based on age), with EEOC v. Kentucky State Police Dept., 860 F.2d 665 (6th 
Cir. 1988) (holding that the police department's policy of mandatorily retiring state 
troopers at the age 55 is not a BFOQ under the ADEA since it is not reasonably linked 
to an employee's physical fitness), affd in part, rev'd in part, 80 F.3d 1086 (6th Cir. 
1996); and Smallwood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 661 F.2d 303, 307-09 (4th Cir. 1981) 
(finding that the practice of not hiring new pilots who are over the age of 35 is not a 
BFOQ in view of the carrier's failure to establish a relationship between the policy and 
airline safety). 
30. See 29 U.S.c. § 623(f)(2)(A) (1994). 
31. See id. § 626(f)(1). 
32. See id. § 626(e) (cross-referencing § 259). 
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under the ADEA must show that both the employee and employer 
are subject to the Act. 
B. Discrimination and the Prima Facie Case 
ADEA violations may be established under either the dispa­
rate impact or disparate treatment of liability.33 In the ADEA con­
text, a disparate treatment claim arises when the employer treats 
some people less favorably than others because of their age.34 In 
such cases, the central question is whether the employer's actions 
were motivated by discriminatory intent.35 By contrast, the dispa­
33. See Smith v. City of Des Moines, 99 F.3d 1466, 1470 (8th Cir. 1996); Fisher v. 
Transco Servs.-Milwaukee, Inc., 979 F.2d 1239, 1244-45 (7th Cir. 1992) (reviewing a 
disparate impact claim based upon a program to measure and evaluate performance); 
Wooden v. Board of Educ., 931 F.2d 376, 379 (6th Cir. 1991) (reviewing a salary policy 
that credited newly employed teachers for up to 10 years prior teaching experience, plus 
a maximum of four years for experience earned more than 10 years ago); MacPherson 
v. University of Montevallo, 922 F.2d 766, 772 (11th Cir. 1991) (reviewing the alleged 
practice of paying market rates to newly hired faculty but not to incumbent professors); 
Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 1417, 1423-24 (9th Cir. 1990) (reviewing subjective 
discretion of managers when making reduction in force ("RIF") decisions); Lowe v. 
Commack Union Free Sch. Dist., 886 F.2d 1364, 1374 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding that plain­
tiffs failed to demonstrate that any of the employer's hiring practices fell more harshly 
on older applicants); Nolting v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 799 F.2d 1192, 1195-96 (8th 
Cir. 1986) (discussing operator evaluation system devised to measure job performance 
and productivity); Holt v. Gamewell Corp., 797 F.2d 36, 37 (1st Cir. 1986) (discussing 
high salary as a criterion for RIF). But see Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 701 
(1st Cir. 1999) ("Since 1993, a majority of the courts of appeals that have addressed the 
question have held that the ADEA does not recognize causes of action premised on 
disparate impact ... proof of intentional discrimination is a prerequisite to liability 
under the ADEA."); EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 
1994) (stating that the ADEA does not prohibit "decisions based on criteria which 
merely tend to affect workers over the age of forty more adversely than workers under 
forty"). See generally Donald R. Stacy, A Case Against Extending the Adverse Impact 
Doctrine to the ADEA, 10 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 437 (1984-85). 
34. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993); cf International 
Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15 (discussing disparate treatment in terms of Title 
VII claims). 
35. See Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 609 (stating that '''[p]roof of discriminatory 
motive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred"') (quoting Interna· 
tional Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15); cf Brinkley·Obu v. Hughes Training, 
Inc., 36 F.3d 336, 34445 & n.17 (4th Cir. 1994) (differentiating plaintiff's burden in 
Equal Pay Act claim, to show unequal pay compared to similarly situated male co­
worker, without regard to motive, from plaintiff's burden in Title VII claim, in which 
plaintiff must prove the differentiation was "motivated by discriminatory intent"); 
Palmer v. Shultz, 815 F.2d 84, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("[T]he ultimate issue in a disparate 
treatment case is whether the disparity resulted from unlawful discriminatory ani­
mus."); Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 898 (3d Cir. 1987) (en banc) 
(stating that the employer must submit sufficient evidence to permit "the trier of fact 
rationally to conclude that the employment decision had not been motivated by discrim­
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rate impact theory of liability holds that an employer's facially neu­
tral policy or practice may be unlawful, even absent a showing of 
discriminatory intent, merely because it has a significant adverse 
impact upon a protected group.36 Thus, disparate treatment focuses 
on discriminatory intent, while disparate impact focuses on discrim­
inatory results. As the three cases discussed in this Article demon­
strate, ADEA claims are typically brought under the disparate 
treatment theory because this type of discrimination is more readily 
apparent to potential plaintiffs who are adversely affected. In addi­
tion, a prima facie case in a disparate impact case may be more 
difficult to establish than in a disparate treatment case because the 
plaintiff must do more than raise an inference of discriminatory im­
pact; the plaintiff must demonstrate the discriminatory impact 
itself.37 
To successfully bring a claim under the ADEA, whether under 
a disparate impact or disparate treatment theory of liability, a plain­
tiff must initially set forth a prima facie case. In disparate impact 
cases, a prima facie case is established by showing that an em­
ployer's policy or practice has a significantly disproportionate im­
pact upon a protected c1ass.38 Once the plaintiff has established a 
prima facie case, the employer may defend its policy or practice by 
proving that the policy is "job related for the position in question 
and consistent with business necessity."39 However, even if the em­
inatory animus") (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 
257 (1981)). 
36. See, e.g., Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 609 (citing International Bhd. of Team­
sters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 
(1988) (plurality opinion); see also EEOC v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., No. 98-3897, 
1999 WL 711068, at *1 (8th Cir. Sept. 14, 1999); Stewart B. McKinney Found., Inc. v. 
Town Plan and Zoning Comm'n, 790 F. Supp. 1197, 1217 (D. Conn. 1992) ("The Second 
Circuit has stated a disparate impact analysis examines a facially-neutral policy or prac­
tice, such as a hiring test or zoning law, for its differential impact or effect on a particu­
lar group, whereas a disparate [differential] treatment analysis involves differential 
treatment of similarly situated persons or groups."). Under the ADEA, the plaintiff's 
protected group would be those "individuals who are at least 40 years of age." See 29 
U.S.c. § 631(a) (1994). 
37. See Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1312 (10th Cir. 1999). 
38. See id. See supra note 36 for additional disparate impact cases. There are two 
tests of statistical significance used to determine whether there is a substantially dispro­
portionate impact. The first is a .05 probability level or two standard deviations. See 29 
C.F.R. § 1607.14B(5) (1999). The other test is the "80 percent rule" which provides that 
an employee establishes a prima facie case of adverse impact when the selection crite­
rion operates to select members of a protected group at a rate less than four fifths that. 
of an allegedly preferred counterpart. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4D (1999). 
39. See 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (1994); see also Bullington, 186 F.3d at 
1312. 
54 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:45 
ployer demonstrates that the policy or practice is job-related and 
consistent with business necessity, a plaintiff may still prove unlaw­
ful age discrimination by showing the existence of "an alternative 
employment practice" with a lesser adverse impact which the em­
ployer refuses to adopt.40 The Supreme Court has yet to resolve 
the issue of whether an ADEA claim may be established by proving 
disparate impact treatment.41 
In disparate treatment cases a prima facie case may be based 
either on a presumption of discrimination arising from the consider­
ation of factors set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,42 or 
by more direct evidence of discriminatory intent.43 Among dispa­
rate treatment cases, each case will be handled differently by the 
courts depending on whether direct or indirect evidence of discrimi­
nation is offered.44 
1. Direct Evidence 
Direct evidence of discrimination is "[ e ]vidence which in and 
of itself suggests that the person or persons with the power to hire, 
fire, promote, and demote the plaintiff were animated by an illegal 
employment criterion ...."45 When a plaintiff proceeds with direct 
40. See 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) (1994); see also Bullington, 186 F.3d at 
1312 (stating that in an ADEA case the plaintiff must offer an alternative employment 
practice that serves the employer's goals without a discriminatory effect). 
41. See Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 609-10 (holding that the disparate treatment 
theory of liability is available under the ADEA). The Court has not, however, ruled on 
whether the disparate impact theory of liability is also available. See id. at 618 (Ken­
nedy, J., concurring) (stating that "substantial arguments" exist against applying dispa­
rate impact analysis to the ADEA). 
42. 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973) (holding that the complainant in a Title VII trial 
must carry the initial burden under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of 
racial discrimination, which may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial 
minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was 
seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, 
after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek 
applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications). See infra Part I.B.2 for a dis­
cussion of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm in the context of the ADEA; see also Ha­
zen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 612 (noting that McDonnell Douglas creates a burden of 
proof framework applicable to ADEA cases). 
43. See generally JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185, at 339-40 
(4th ed. 1992) (defining "direct" and "circumstantial" evidence). See infra Part 1.B.1 
for a discussion of what may constitute direct evidence. 
44. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (finding 
that the burden shifting scheme set forth in McDonnell Douglas is not applicable in 
ADEA cases where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination). 
45. Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 972 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Miles v. 
M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 873-74 (11th Cir. 1985). 
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evidence of discriminatory intent, the evidence by itself is sufficient 
to establish a prima facie case of impermissible discrimination.46 
Direct evidence usually takes the form of statements made by man­
agers or supervisors demonstrating their bias.47 Statements by 
"nondecision-makers" or statements by decision-makers unrelated 
to the adverse employment decision usually do not suffice.48 
Furthermore, for a remark to constitute direct evidence, it 
must bear some relationship to the employment decision in ques­
tion. Inappropriate but isolated and ambiguous comments that 
amount to no more than "stray remarks" will not suffice.49 How­
46. See Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1528 n.6 (11th Cir. 1987) (find­
ing that direct evidence, which is rarely found in discrimination cases, is evidence that 
"proves [the] existence of [a] fact in issue without inference or presumption") (citations 
omitted). 
47. See EEOC v. G-K-G Inc., 39 F.3d 740, 746-47 (7th Cir. 1994) (recognizing that 
the comment by the decision-making supervisor that the plaintiffs accounts could use 
some "younger blood" constituted direct evidence of discrimination); Sischo-Nownejad 
v. Merced Community College Dist., 934 F.2d 1104, 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating 
that a supervisor's reference to a teacher as "an old warhorse" and to her students as 
"little old ladies" constituted direct evidence of age and gender bias); Morgan v. Arkan­
sas Gazette, 897 F.2d 945, 951 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding that the city circulation manager's 
statement that the plaintiff was "an old fuddy-duddy" constituted direct evidence of 
discrimination); Spulak v. K Mart Corp., 894 F.2d 1150, 1155 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding 
that references to older workers as "old fogies" and statements to plaintiff that if he 
were younger he could work for the manager were probative of pretext); Siegel v. Al­
pha Wire Corp., 894 F.2d 50, 55 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that the manager's use of the 
phrase "old dogs won't hunt" when referring to the plaintiff and another older em­
ployee, coupled with evidence of favorable employment evaluations for younger em­
ployees, raised a material issue as to whether the reasons given for the plaintiffs 
discharge were pretextual). 
48. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring) ("[S]tray remarks in the workplace ... cannot justify requiring the em­
ployer to prove that its hiring or promotion decisions were based on legitimate criteria. 
Nor can statements by nondecisionmakers, or statements by decisionmakers unrelated 
to the decisional process itself, suffice to satisfy the plaintiffs burden in this regard."); 
Mauter v. Hardy Corp., 825 F.2d 1554, 1558 (11th Cir. 1987) (finding that an alleged 
comment by the company vice-president that management planned to "weed out the 
old ones" does not undermine the defendant's articulated reason for the plaintiffs dis­
missal because it was undisputed that the vice-president played no part in the termina­
tion decision); La Montagne v. American Convenience Prods., Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 1412 
(7th Cir. 1984) (stating that evidence that a senior vice-president told the president not 
to terminate the plaintiff until he had a younger replacement was insufficient to support 
a verdict for the plaintiff because the president did not need the vice-president's concur­
rence to terminate the plaintiff). 
49. See Fuka v. Thomson Consumer Elec., 82 F.3d 1397, 1403 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(stating that to "qualify as direct evidence of discrimination, the plaintiff must show that 
the remarks 'were related to the employment decision in question"') (quoting McCar­
thy v. Kemper Life Ins. Cos., 924 F.2d 683, 686-87 (7th Cir. 1991»; Cone v. Longmont 
United Hosp. Ass'n, 14 F.3d 526, 531 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that the CEO's statement 
that the hospital "need[s] some new young blood" and that "long-term employees have 
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ever, if the plaintiff's direct evidence proves that his or her age was 
a motivating or substantial factor in the contested employment de­
cision, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant.50 To meet this 
burden, the defendant must then show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the same employment decision would have been 
made even if the improper criteria played no role in the decision.51 
In the absence of such a showing by the defendant, summary judg­
ment will be granted in favor of the plaintiff.52 However, due to the 
heightened awareness of employers, managers, and supervisors re-
a diminishing return" are stray remarks and insufficient to defeat the hospital's motion 
for summary judgment); Heim v. Utah, 8 F.3d 1541, 1547 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that 
inappropriate personal opinions do not prove employer acted with discriminatory in­
tent); Nesbit v. Pepsico, Inc., 994 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that the decision­
maker's statement "[we] don't necessarily like grey hair," where not tied to the plain­
tiff's termination, was a stray remark that could not defeat summary judgment for the 
employer); Waggoner v. City of Garland, 987 F.2d 1160, 1166 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding 
that the stray remark that the plaintiff is an "old fart" is insufficient to raise an issue of 
material fact); McCarthy, 924 F.2d at 686-87 (stating that racial comments alone cannot 
suffice to prove discrimination; it must be shown that race was in fact relied upon in 
making the employment decision); DeHorney v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 
879 F.2d 459, 468 (9th Cir. 1989) (requiring in § 1981 cases a nexus between the alleged 
animus and the decision to terminate); ct. EEOC v. Beverage Canners, Inc., 897 F.2d 
1067, 1071 (11th Cir. 1990) (upholding the trial court's finding that racially hostile re­
marks were so "commonplace, overt and denigrating" that they created an atmosphere 
charged with racial hostility); Siegal v. Alpha Wire Corp., 894 F.2d 50, 55 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(reversing summary judgment for the employer in light of the company president's re­
peated use of the phrase "old dogs won't hunt"). 
50. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250 ("[T]he plaintiff who shows that an 
impermissible motive played a motivating part in an adverse employment decision has 
thereby placed upon the defendant the burden to show that it would have made the 
same decision in the absence of the unlawful motive."); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. 
of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (finding that once an illegal motive is proved 
to have been a significant factor in an employment decision, the defendant must show 
"by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision" 
even absent that factor); see also Haynes v. W.C. Caye & Co., 52 F.3d 928, 931 (11th 
Cir. 1995); Brown v. East Miss. Elec. Power Ass'n, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir. 1993); 
Beshears v. Asbill, 930 F.2d 1348, 1353 (8th Cir. 1991). 
51. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 252-53. 
52. A party is entitled to summary judgment upon a showing that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). All justifiable inferences must be drawn in 
favor of the non-movant. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 
(1986). Conc1usory allegations are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judg­
ment when the movant has met its summary judgment burden. See, e.g., Campbell v. 
Sonat Offshore Drilling, Inc., 979 F.2d 1115, 1119 (5th Cir. 1992). To successfully op­
pose a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant cannot rest on mere allegations 
or denials but must set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact 
exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Celotex Corp. v Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321-22 (1986). 
A material fact is any fact "that might affect the outcome of the suit under the gov­
erning law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 
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garding their potential liability, "there is rarely direct evidence of 
discrimination."53 Given the difficulty of obtaining direct evidence 
of discrimination, plaintiffs have been forced to resort to the "indi­
rect method" of proof articulated by the Supreme Court in McDon­
nell Douglas. 
2. Indirect Evidence 
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,54 and more recently in 
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,55 the Supreme Court articulated 
a burden shifting scheme for discrimination cases.56 Although the 
plaintiff must always establish a prima facie case, the Supreme 
Court has stated that "[t]he burden of establishing a prima facie 
case of disparate treatment is not onerous."57 In an ADEA hiring 
case,58 the prima facie case consists of a showing that (1) the plain­
tiff is a member of the protected class; (2) the plaintiff suffered an 
adverse employment action; (3) the plaintiff was qualified for the 
position at issue; and (4) the plaintiff was treated less favorably 
than others not in the protected class.59 
53. Ingels v. Thiokol Corp., 42 F.3d 616, 621 (10th Cir. 1994); see also United 
States Postal Servo Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983) ("There will 
seldom be 'eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental processes."); Rosen v. 
Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 528, 533 (2d Cir. 1991) ("An employer who discriminates is un­
likely to leave a 'smoking gun,' such as a notation in an employee's personnel file, 
attesting to a discriminatory intent."); cf Richards v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 668 
F. Supp. 259, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that "direct, smoking gun, evidence of dis­
crimination" is not required for the plaintiff to prevail), affd 842 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 
1988). 
54. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
55. 509 U.S. 502 (1993). 
56. "The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden under the 
statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination .... The burden then 
must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 
the employee's rejection." McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. See supra note 
42 for the requirements of the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting scheme. 
57. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,253 (1981). The 
requirement of a prima facie case of age discrimination is not met unless there is "at 
least a logical connection between each element of the prima facie case and the illegal 
discrimination for which it establishes a 'legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption.'" 
O'Connor v. Consolidated Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311-12 (1996) (quoting Bur­
dine, 450 U.S. at 254 n.7). Thus, an inference of discrimination cannot be made where 
an employer replaces a worker with someone under 40 if that person is only insignifi­
cantly younger. See id. 
58. The Supreme Court has never decided whether the McDonnell Douglas test 
applies to ADEA cases. See O'Connor, 517 U.S. at 311 (assuming the framework's 
applicability in an ADEA case where neither party challenged it). 
59. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802; Bullington v. United Air 
Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1315-16 (10th Cir. 1999); see also Rinehart v. City of Inde­
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Once the plaintiff presents a prima facie case, the burden shifts 
to the employer to produce evidence of a legitimate, nondiscrimina­
tory reason for its decision.60 A legitimate nondiscriminatory rea­
son is essential for an employer to survive a summary judgment 
motion.61 Although the employer's burden at this stage may ap­
pear exceedingly light, the employer must "articulate its nondis­
criminatory reason for the challenged action with some specificity 
in order to afford the plaintiff a full and fair opportunity to demon­
strate pretext."62 Legitimate reasons commonly asserted by an em­
ployer include the plaintiff's unsuitability or incompetence,63 
economic factors,64 as well as various policy reasons.65 Other exam­
ples of legitimate reasons employers have articulated to rebut an 
inference of discrimination include: lesser comparative qualifica­
tions,66 inability to get along with supervisors or other employees,67 
pendence; 35 F.3d 1263, 1264 (8th Cir. 1994); Hebert v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 872 F.2d 
1104,1110-11 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating the requirements for a prima facie case in a reduc­
tion-in-force case); Davis v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 920-21 (6th 
Cir.1984). 
60. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53 (discussing burdens of production and persua­
sion in Title VII disparate treatment cases) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. 
at 802). 
61. See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (f)(1) (1994) (stating that an employer may defend an age 
discrimination claim on the ground that differentiation was based on "reasonable fac­
tors other than age"). 
62. See FIVE YEAR CuMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT TO SCHLEI & GROSSMAN'S EM· 
PLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 480 & n.73 (David A. Cathcart & R. Lawrence Ashe, 
Jr., eds., 2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW SUPP.]. 
63. See, e.g., Cliff v. Board of Sch. Comrn'rs, 42 F.3d 403, 411-12 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(upholding summary judgment for school district based on evidence that the plaintiff 
was an ineffective teacher); Austin v. Cornell Univ., 891 F. Supp. 740, 747 (N.D.N.Y. 
1995) (discussing employer's refusal to re-hire plaintiffs based on their past poor per­
formance and inability to perform increased responsibilities). 
64. See, e.g., Aremendariz v. Pinkerton Tobacco Co., 58 F.3d 144, 150 (5th Cir. 
1995) ("Job elimination or office consolidation is a sufficient nondiscriminatory reason 
for discharge."); Allen v. Diebold Inc., 33 F.3d 674, 679 (6th Cir. 1994) (finding defend­
ant's replacement of plaintiffs with younger, less costly workers did not state an ADEA 
claim); Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 907 F. Supp. 864, 875 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (observing in a 
reduction-in-force case that "[e]conomic necessity is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for employment decisions") (citations omitted). 
65. See, e.g., Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1005 (10th Cir. 1996) (find­
ing that even if the plaintiffs established a prima facie case, summary judgment for 
defendant would be upheld because refusal to hire was based on defendant's legitimate 
weight standards); Kralman v. Illinois Dep't of Veterans' Affairs, 23 F.3d 150, 157 (7th 
Cir. 1994) (upholding rejection of plaintiff's job application where defendant gave hir­
ing preference to a veteran); Roxas v. Presentation College, 885 F. Supp. 1323, 1328 
(D.S.D. 1995) (finding a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason where employer's rejec­
tion of employee's application for a paid sabbatical was based upon deficiencies in the 
application submitted). 
66. See, e.g., Wooden v. Board of Educ., 931 F.2d 376, 378 (6th Cir. 1991) (recog­
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insubordination,68 and poor performance.69 However, courts are 
skeptical of an employer's reason when the employment decision is 
based on vague sUbjective standards, such as the lack of dedication, 
enthusiasm, and even ability or skill.70 
If the employer sufficiently meets its burden of production, the 
presumption of intentional discrimination disappears and the bur­
den shifts back to the employee to prove that the employer's articu­
lated reason for the adverse employment action was a pretext for 
discrimination.?1 To meet this burden, the plaintiff cannot simply 
nizing that a more qualified applicant was hired); Goetz v. Farm Credit Servs., 927 F.2d 
398, 401 (8th Cir. 1991) (recognizing selection of better qualified applicant); Weber v. 
Port Arthur Sch. Bd., 759 F. Supp. 341, 343 (E.D. Tex. 1991) (finding position filled by 
more qualified applicant); Collins v. School Dist., 727 F. Supp. 1318, 1323 (W.D. Mo. 
1990) (finding individual with superior work experience was hired). 
67. See, e.g., McNairn v. Sullivan, 929 F.2d 974, 978 (4th Cir. 1991) (finding that 
employee was not promoted because she was caustic with other employees, made mis­
takes, and did not follow instructions); Blake v. J.C. Penney Co., 894 F.2d 274, 278 (8th 
Cir. 1990) (finding that employee was discharged for slapping a co-worker); Burrus v. 
United Tel. Co., 683 F.2d 339, 342 (10th Cir. 1982) (upholding employment decision 
based on employee's inability to get along with others); Jones v. Lumberjack Meats, 
Inc., 680 F.2d 98,101 (11th Cir. 1982) (recognizing poor relations with fellow employees 
as a legitimate reason for discharge). 
68. See, e.g., Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 777 (11th Cir. 1991) (recog­
nizing that the refusal to follow company policies and disregarding orders from supervi­
sors are legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for adverse employment action). 
69. See, e.g., Little v. Republic Ref. Co., 924 F.2d 93, 97 (5th Cir. 1991); Shager v. 
Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 401 (7th Cir. 1990); Hebert v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 872 F.2d 
1104, 1113-14 (1st Cir. 1989). 
70. See McCullough v. Real Foods, Inc., 140 F.3d 1123, 1129 (8th Cir. 1998) (stat­
ing that the employer's sole reliance on subjective selection criteria, including the fact 
that the employee wanted a lot of time off and planned to quit soon, was "critical" to 
the court's finding that the employer's asserted reasons could be considered pretextual); 
Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 871-72 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding that where the 
employer had only offered subjective and vague criteria for firing the employee, such as 
one supervisor's evaluation that the employee was "not a good worker," and where 
there were no guidelines for evaluating performance and no regular or written evalua­
tions made on employees, the employer did not meet its burden of showing a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason); cf. Baldwin v. Bellsouth Adver. & Publ'g Corp., 677 F. 
Supp. 1573, 1581 (M.D. Ga. 1988) (finding that employer used several objective reports 
in addition to subjective evaluations to make its decision and acknowledging that some 
subjectivity is unavoidable). See generally EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW SuPP., 
supra note 62, at 484 & n.99 (noting that some courts scrutinize more closely employ­
ment decisions when they are based on subjective criteria or standards). 
71. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) 
(indicating that the ultimate burden remains with the employee to prove intentional 
discrimination); Udo v. Tomes, 54 F.3d 9,12 (1st Cir. 1995) (emphasizing that the pre­
sumption of discrimination disappears once the employer articulates a nondiscrimina­
tory reason for its decision); Courtney v. Biosound, Inc., 42 F.3d 414, 418 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(indicating that no presumption of discrimination exists once the employer provides a 
nondiscriminatory basis for its action); Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th 
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rely upon the prima facie case.72 Rather, "there must be some addi­
tional evidence beyond the elements of the prima facie case to sup­
port a finding of pretext."73 A plaintiff may establish pretext either 
with direct evidence that the employer "was more likely than not 
motivated by a discriminatory reason," or with indirect evidence 
that the employer's explanation lacks credibility.74 This may be 
accomplished if the plaintiff can show "such weaknesses, implausi­
bilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the em­
ployer's proffered reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder 
could rationally find them unworthy of credence."75 The plaintiff 
may also use comparative evidence76 or statistics77 to demonstrate 
Cir. 1994) (noting that the employer's nondiscriminatory reason eliminates the pre­
sumption of discrimination created by the plaintiffs prima facie case); Carter v. City of 
Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 584 (11th Cir. 1989) (stating that in order to avoid a directed 
verdict, the plaintiff must present "significantly probative" evidence of pretext). 
72. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1993) (finding that 
once the defendant carries its burden of production, "'the presumption raised by the 
prima facie case is rebutted,''' and the plaintiff must then prove that the legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reasons offered by the defendant were not the true reasons for the 
employment decision) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255); see also Lam v. University of 
Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551, 1558-59 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that in order to prevail, "the 
plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer's alleged reason for the adverse employ­
ment decision is a pretext for another motive which is discriminatory") (quoting Wallis, 
26 F.3d at 889); Monaco v. Fuddruckers, Inc., 1 F.3d 658, 661 (7th Cir. 1993) (same). In 
addition, the employee may not rely solely on his or her subjective belief that the termi­
nation resulted from age discrimination. See Molnar v. Ebasco Constructors, Inc., 986 
F.2d 115, 119 (5th Cir. 1993); see also EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW SuPP., supra 
note 62, at 266 & n.37. 
73. Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 959 (8th Cir. 1995); see also Wolf 
v. Buss (America) Inc., 77 F.3d 914, 919-20 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that the test of 
pretext in an ADEA case is whether an employer honestly believes the reasons it gives, 
not whether it made mistakes or bad business judgments) (citing McCoy v. WGN Con­
tinental Broad. Co., 957 F.2d 368, 373 (7th Cir. 1992»; Caponigro v. Navistar Int'! 
Transp. Corp., No. 93-C-0647, 1995 WL 238655, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 1995) (unre­
ported decision) (finding that the plaintiff must show that each reason offered by the 
employer is a pretext, although if the reasons are sufficiently intertwined, a successful 
attack on one may call the others into doubt). 
74. See Sarsha v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 3 F.3d 1035, 1039 (7th Cir. 1993). 
75. Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1317 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(quoting Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting Olson v. 
General Elec. Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 951-52 (3d Cir. 1996))). It is not enough, how­
ever, to assert that the employer's proffered reasons are not "wise, fair or correct"; 
rather, the question is whether the employer "honestly believed those reasons and ac­
ted in good faith upon those beliefs." Id. at 1318 (citing Sanchez v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 
992 F.2d 244, 247 (10th Cir. 1993»; see also Fischbach v. District of Columbia Dept. of 
Corrections, 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting McCoy, 957 F.2d at 373; 
Pignato v. American Trans Air., Inc., 14 F.3d 342, 349 (7th Cir. 1994». 
76. Comparative evidence shows that similarly situated employees outside of the 
plaintiffs protected group received favored treatment, did not receive the same adverse 
treatment, or that the employer's treatment of the plaintiff departed from its normal 
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that an employer's reasoning for termination was simply a pretext 
to cover underlying discrimination. 
II. "OVERQUALIFICATION" AND THE COURTS 
The question of whether "overqualification" constitutes a legit­
imate nondiscriminatory reason for denying employment is impor­
tant to older applicants seeking work. If "overqualification" is 
considered a legitimate reason for an adverse employment action, 
employers will be free to prevent older applicants from re-entering 
the workforce in entry-level positions. On the other hand, if "over­
qualification" is considered a prohibited reason for denial of em­
ployment, older applicants will have more opportunities available 
to them when they seek employment. This issue has been consid­
ered in the Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits with varying results. 
This section will discuss the decisions rendered by these courts. 
A. Taggart v. Time Inc.78 
Thomas Taggart ("Taggart") was employed as a print produc­
tion manager by Preview Subscription Television, Inc. ("Preview"), 
a subsidiary of Time, Inc. ("Time"}.79 In May of 1983, Time noti­
fied Preview employees that it intended to dissolve Preview and lay 
off its employees.8o On September 2, 1983, it did just that.81 Tune 
invited the laid-off employees to apply for job openings at Tune.82 
Of the more than thirty jobs at Time that Taggart applied for, he 
obtained eight interviews.83 Seven of the employers concluded that 
policies or practices. See generally EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW SuPP., supra 
note 62, at 264-66; Carolyn Ratti Matthews, Comment, Accent: Legitimate Nondiscrimi­
natory Reason or Permission to Discriminate?, 23 ARIz. ST. L.J. 231, 248 (1991). 
77. See Pollard v. Rea Magnet Wire Co., 824 F.2d 557, 556 (7th Cir. 1987); Weems 
v. Ball Metal & Chern. Div., Inc., 753 F.2d 527, 531 (6th Cir. 1985); Miles v. M.N.C. 
Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 870 (11th Cir. 1985); Elliott v. Group Med. & Surgical Serv., 714 
F.2d. 556 (5th Cir. 1983). 
78. 924 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1991), rev'g No. 87 CIV. 3408 (MBM), 1990 WL 16956, at 
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 1990) (unreported decision). 
79. See Taggart, 1990 WL 16956, at *l. 
80. See id. 

8l. See id. 

82. See id. 
83. See id. Each of these employers conducted interviews with Taggart and stated 
various reasons for not hiring him. See id. Such reasons included: interviewer thought 
pressure would affect Taggart and that he appeared unenthusiastic about the job; others 
had superior production backgrounds and made a better impression during the inter­
view; interviewer was not impressed with Taggart or his ideas as to how to resolve 
Time's operating deficiencies; he lacked electronic scanner skills and experience; he 
made typographical errors in his resume; he scored lowest on color matching aptitude 
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Taggart was unqualified.84 However, Home Box Office ("HBO"), 
the eighth employer to interview Taggart, stated that it would not 
hire Taggart because he was overqualified.85 Consequently, on May 
17, 1985, Taggart filed a claim of age discrimination with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").86 On May 13, 
1987, he filed a complaint in the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of New York, claiming that all eight inter­
views were a sham and that his age was the real reason he was de­
nied employment.87 
The district court applied the McDonnell Douglas test88 and 
concluded that Taggart failed to state a prima facie case of discrimi­
nation because he did not show that he was "appropriately qualified 
for many of the positions or that the evidence raise[ d] an inference 
of discrimination."89 Further, the court stated that in all eight in­
stances the "[d]efendant has satisfied its burden to articulate legiti­
mate, non-age related reasons for refusing to rehire" Taggart and 
that Taggart had not "rebutted those legitimate reasons by 'solid 
circumstantial evidence' showing them to be mere pretexts."90 
Thus, the district court granted summary judgment for Time.91 
Taggart appealed the district court decision to the Court of Ap­
peals for the Second Circuit.92 The Second Circuit affirmed the 
summary judgment with respect to three of the four positions for 
which Taggart was turned down on the basis that those decisions 
were not age discriminatory.93 However, the appeals court dis­
agreed with the trial court regarding the position at HBO.94 Specif­
ically, the court of appeals rejected Time's argument that 
"overqualified" can mean "unqualified."95 Rather, the court deter­
mined that denying employment because of "overqualification" 
test on job application; he failed to meet the basic job qualifications; he had no financial 
experience; and he was argumentative during job application process. See id. at *4-6. 
84. See id. at *4. 
85. See id. Since the position was a "junior position," the interviewer thought the 
job would not interest or challenge Taggart. See id. 
86. See id. at *2. 
87. See id. 
88. See id. See supra Part I.B.2 for a discussion of the McDonnell Douglas test. 
89. Taggart, 1990 WL 16956, at *9. 
90. Id. (quoting Clements v. County of Nassau, 835 F.2d 1000, 1005 (2d Cir. 
1987». 
91. See id. 
92. See Taggart v. Time hic., 924 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1991). 
93. See id. at 46-47. 
94. See id. at 47-48. 
95. See id. at 47. 
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alone may be "a euphemism to mask the real reason for refusal [to 
hire], namely, [that] in the eyes of the employer the applicant is too 
old."96 Thus, the Second Circuit rejected the district court's conclu­
sion that it was reasonable to exclude an overqualified applicant on 
the grounds that the job would not challenge the applicant.97 The 
case was reversed and remanded for a trial on the merits.98 
B. Stein v. National City Bank99 
In March 1985, Sol Stein ("Stein") applied for a customer ser­
vice representative position with National City Bank ("Bank").1°O 
The Bank had an unwritten policy of not hiring college graduates 
for that position because it believed that college graduates would 
leave the position as soon they found that it was not sufficiently 
challenging.IOI Because Stein had a college degree, he was not 
hired.102 In June 1985, Stein filed a discrimination claim with the 
EEOC based on age and/or religion. lo3 The EEOC determined 
that the Bank did not discriminate against Stein on either 
ground.104 Stein then filed a discrimination complaint in federal 
court based on violations of the ADEA and Title VII.105 The dis­
trict court found that Stein failed to make out a prima facie case of 
age discrimination and granted summary judgment to the Bank.106 
Stein appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals where the 
court applied the McDonnell Douglas test.107 It found that Stein 
made out a prima facie case of age discrimination.lo8 However, the 
court also found that the Bank's proffered reason for not hiring 
Stein was legitimate.109 Specifically, the court was persuaded that a 
policy of only hiring individuals who are more likely to remain em­
96. [d. 
97. See id. 

9S. See id. at 4S. 

99. 942 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1991). 
100. See id. at 1064. 
101. See id. 
102. See id. 
103. See id. at 1063-64. 
104. See id. at 1064. 
105. See id. He later abandoned his Title VII claim. See id. 
106. See id. 
107. See id. at 1064-65. See supra Part I.B.2 for a discussion of the McDonnell 
Douglas factors and the test's use as a burden-shifting device in Title VII cases. 
lOS. See id. at 1064-65. Plaintiff made out a prima facie case because he was (1) a 
member of the protected class; (2) subjected to an adverse employment action; (3) qual­
ified for the position; and (4) replaced by a younger person. See id. 
109. See id. 
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ployed for a prolonged period of time would promote the em­
ployer's interest in reducing turnover.110 Further, the court 
reasoned that turnover could also be decreased if the company did 
not hire individuals who would get bored easily or could obtain bet­
ter jobS.111 Although Stein argued that reducing turnover was 
pre textual because the hiring policy was not uniformly applied and 
was unreasonable because it failed to achieve its purported ends, 
the court summarily concluded that Stein's assertions were without 
merit and upheld summary judgment for the employer.112 
C. EEOC v; Insurance Co. of North America113 
In June 1988, Richard Pugh ("Pugh") responded to an adver­
tisement for a "loss control representative" by submitting a resume 
to Insurance Co. of North America ("ICNA").114 Pugh had more 
than thirty years experience in loss control and engineering.11s De­
spite this fact, Pugh was never interviewed for the position.116 He 
filed a complaint with the EEOC alleging age discrimination.117 In 
response, ICNA claimed that it did not interview Pugh because "he 
was overqualified ... would have delved too deeply into accounts 
... and [would have unnecessarily] consume[d] too much of the 
insureds' time. "118 The district court found that Pugh established a 
prima facie case of age discrimination.119 To meet its burden, 
ICNA explained that it rejected Pugh because he had an unprofes­
sional resume and his background was too technical for the posi­
tion.120 Upon concluding that ICNA's proffered reasons were 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory, and not pretextual,121 the district 
court granted summary judgment for ICNA.122 Subsequently, the 
EEOC appealed to the Ninth Circuit.123 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit assumed that the 
principal reason Pugh was rejected was that he was considered 
110. See id. 
111. See id. 
112. See id. at 1065-66. 
113. 49 F.3d 1418 (9th Cir. 1995). 
114. See id. at 1419. 
115. See id. 
116. See id. 
117. See id. 
118. Id. 
119. See id. at 1419-20 & n.1. 
120. See id. at 1420. 
121. See id. 
122. See id. at 1419. 
123. See id. 
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overqualified; the court did not address whether the alternative rea­
sons for rejecting Pugh were supportive of a summary judgment 
motion.124 The court noted that the rejection of an applicant on the 
basis of "overqualification" may sometimes function as a proxy for 
age discrimination.125 However, the court held that a refusal to hire 
a prospective employee based on an honest belief that he is over­
qualified for a position does not by itself violate the ADEA.126 In­
deed, the Ninth Circuit determined that ICNA's rejection of Pugh 
due to his "overqualification" was based on a defined business in­
terest,127 The court further found that the company's reason for 
rejecting Pugh was objective, non-age related, and that the evidence 
supported the conclusion that ICNA's rejection was not a mask for 
age discrimination.128 
While Taggart, Stein, and Insurance Co. of North America ad­
dressed the use of "overqualification" by employers as a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason for employment decisions that affect 
older workers, the question remains as to whether "overqualifica­
tion," standing alone, should be recognized by the courts as a legiti­
mate reason to deny employment, thus requiring age discrimination 
plaintiffs to prove it is pretextual. To answer this question it is nec­
essary to analyze the three cases in light of the types of criteria that 
employers use in making employment decisions. 
III. 	 "OVERQUALIFICATION": PRETEXT OR LEGITIMATE 
NONDISCRIMINATORY REASON 
This section will show that the use of "overqualification" as a 
reason for rejecting an applicant can be, and often is, a mask for age 
discrimination. However, since "overqualification" can also be a 
legitimate reason for an adverse employment decision, this section 
will explore the various methods and devices used by employers 
when making employment decisions and analyze the extent to 
which these devices may provide objective evidence to support an 
employer's claim that "overqualification" was the employer's legiti­
mate nondiscriminatory reason. This section will further show that 
while Taggert and Stein were correctly decided, Insurance Co. of 
North America was not. Lastly, this section will further assert that 
124. See id. at 1420 n.2 (stating that "the primary reason leNA did not interview 
or hire Pugh was that it considered him overqualified for the position"). 
125. See id. at 1420-21. 
126. See id. at 1420. 
127. See id. at 1421. 
128. See id. 
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employers who rely solely on subjective reasons to justify adverse 
employment decisions, such as an applicant's "overqualification" 
for the position, will expose themselves to potential discrimination 
lawsuits. 
A. "Overqualification": Evidence of Discrimination? 
Employers generally rely on two types of criteria when at­
tempting to assert a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for hiring, 
promotion, transfer, and discharge decisions: objective and subjec­
tive criteria. Objective129 criteria typically include: scored tests,13° 
education requirements,131 work experience,132 or performance,133 
Such criteria are neutral because they are applied mechanically and 
without exception to all applicants and employees and leave little or 
no room for the use of discretion. Nevertheless, objective criteria 
can be the basis of either a disparate impact or disparate treatment 
claim. A disparate impact claim may exist if the application of the 
neutral criteria has an adverse impact on a protected group.134 A 
disparate treatment claim may also exist if a criterion is applied in a 
129. Objective is defined as "expressing or involving the use of facts without dis­
tortion by personal feelings or prejudices." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 
1556 (3d ed. 1993). 
130. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424,432 (1971); EEOC v. Navajo 
Ref. Co., 593 F.2d 988, 992 (10th Cir. 1979). 
131. See, e.g., EEOC v. Joint Apprenticeship Comm., 895 F.2d 86, 91 (2d Cir. 
1990) (remanding for determination whether prerequisites for admission into an electri­
cian apprenticeship program (high school diploma requirement and maximum age 
limit) have any disparate impact on African Americans and women); Briggs v. Ander­
son, 796 F.2d 1009, 1023 (8th Cir. 1986) (finding that plaintiff "failed to show that the 
degree requirement did not 'bear a demonstrable relationship to successful perform­
ance of the [job] for which it is used"') (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431); Carpenter v. 
Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 706 F.2d 608 (5th Cir. 1983) (using high school education 
requirement); Navajo Ref Co., 593 F.2d at 992 (stating that the "company is free to use 
its tests and high school education requirements if the result is not discrimination in 
fact"); Payne v. Travenol Lab., Inc., 565 F.2d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1978) (stating that the 
defendants failed to prove that the college degree requirement was justified by business 
necessity). 
132. See, e.g., Foster v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 872 F.2d 1563, 1569 (11th Cir. 
1989) (requiring prior administrative experience for position as school principal); 
Cooper v. Allen, 493 F.2d 765, 766 (5th Cir. 1974) (requiring five years experience to 
become professional golfer). 
133. See, e.g., Dwyer v. Smith, 867 F.2d 184, 189 (4th Cir. 1989) (requiring that 
police officers qualify with a 12-gauge shotgun fired from the shoulder); Castro v. 
Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 734 (1st Cir. 1972) (requiring a swim test for police officers). 
134. See supra Part I.B for a discussion of age discrimination based on disparate 
impact. 
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different manner to certain protected class members.135 
By contrast, subjective136 criteria allow for the use of discretion 
by the decision maker.137 An employer using subjective criteria 
draws on his or her perspectives, beliefs, experiences, and judgment 
when making a decision. Subjective selection devices include: in­
terviews, performance appraisals not based on "hard" data such as 
quantifiable attendance or production records, nepotism, and the 
use of "grapevine" hiring or promotion systems which selectively 
announce job openings.138 In addition, employment valuations 
based on a person's leadership or aggressiveness, ability to fit in, 
interpersonal skills, or other traits such as personal appearance, in­
terest, attitude, and personality constitute subjective criteria.139 
These discretionary criteria are standardless in the sense that there 
are no identifiable means by which they can be measured. Conse­
quently, the application of subjective devices is characterized by a 
lack of uniformity. 
Whether based on objective or subjective criteria, ADEA vio­
lations may be established by proving either disparate treatment or 
disparate impact.14o As a practical matter, plaintiffs can more easily 
attack subjective criteria under the disparate treatment theory be­
135. See supra Part LB for a discussion of age discrimination based on disparate 
treatment. 
136. Subjective is defined as "peculiar to a particular individual modified by indi­
vidual bias and limitations: personal." WEBSTER'S TlflRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 
2275-76 (3d ed. 1993). 
137. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.6B(I) (1999) (referring to subjective criteria as "infor­
mal" or "unscored" procedures); Andrea R. Waintroob, The Developing Law of Equal 
Employment Opportunity at the White Collar and Professional Level, 21 WM. & MARY 
L. REv. 45, 48 (1979) (stating that subjective procedures are those in which "judgment 
or discretion [is exercised] on the part of the evaluator"). See generally EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAW SUPP., supra note 62, at 194-206 (discussing the characteristics of 
subjective employment practices). 
138. See, e.g., Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association in 
Support of Petitioner at 14, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) 
(citing BENJAMIN SCHNEIDER & NEAL SCHMITT, STAFFING ORGANIZATIONS (2d ed. 
1986); IRWIN L. GOLDSTEIN, TRAINING IN ORGANIZATIONS (2d ed. 1986». 
139. See Donald R. Stacy, Subjective Criteria in Employment Decisions Under Ti­
tle VII, 10 GA. L. REv. 737, 737, 740-41 (1976); see also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & 
Trust, 798 F.2d 791, 812 n.26 (5th Cir. 1986) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (examining em­
ployer evaluations of employees on such factors as drive, friendliness, courtesy, and 
personal appearance). 
140. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 617-18 (1993) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (stating that the Court has "not yet addressed the question whether such a 
claim is cognizable under the ADEA, and there are substantial arguments that it is 
improper to carry over disparate impact analysis from Title VII to the ADEA"). The 
majority agreed that the issue was an open question. See id. at 610. See supra Part I.B 
for a discussion of the disparate impact and disparate treatment theories of liability. 
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cause offering statistical evidence of subjective data is very difficult 
and costly.141 In an ADEA disparate treatment case, the question 
that must be answered when subjective evidence is presented by an 
employer as its legitimate reason for an employment decision is 
whether the employment decision was wholly motivated by non-age 
factors.142 This question is of the utmost importance because if it is 
not answered in the affirmative, an age discrimination suit will be 
dismissed in favor of the employer. However, if plaintiffs can get 
past the summary judgment stage and to a jury, their chances of 
obtaining a favorable settlement or jury award improve substan­
tially, since juries tend to favor employees over employers. 
When analyzing whether subjective criteria are legitimate and 
nondiscriminatory, courts often consider whether the employer uses 
criteria based upon observable behaviors or job performance rat­
ings rather than personal traits.143 Another factor to be considered 
is whether the employer uses objective criteria in conjuJ;lction with 
the sUbjective criteria in the decision-making process.144 Absent 
objective evidence that clearly indicates that the subjective criterion 
itself, rather than age, was the decisive factor in the employment 
decision, a claim for age discrimination should proceed so that a 
fact finder may have an opportunity to scrutinize the defendant's 
credi bili ty . 
Although subjective employment criteria are especially suscep-
See supra note 33 for lower court cases that have applied both theories of liability in 
ADEA cases. 
141. See, e.g., Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847, 869-70 (D. Minn. 
1993) (holding defendants liable under both disparate impact and disparate treatment 
claims by the plaintiffs); Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 259, 330-36 (N.D. 
Cal. 1992) (analyzing relief under both disparate impact and disparate treatment theory 
for respondent's subjective decision making). 
142. See Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 611. "In a disparate treatment case, liabil­
ity depends on whether the protected trait (under the ADEA, age) actually motivated 
the employer's decision." Id. at 610 (citations omitted). "'Proof of discriminatory mo­
tive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of 
differences in treatment. ...'" Id. at 609 (quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 
324,335-36 n.15 (1977)). See supra Part 1.B.2 for a discussion of the burdens of proof in 
a disparate treatment case. 
143. See Lujan v. Walters, 813 F.2d 1051, 1057 (10th Cir. 1987) (stating that "the 
use of such subjective criteria as 'dedicated' and 'enthusiasm' may offer a convenient 
pretext for giving force and effect to prejudice, and can create a strong inference of 
employment discrimination") (citing Mohammed v. Callaway, 698 F.2d 395, 401 (10th 
Cir. 1983)); cf Lerma v. Bolger, 689 F.2d 589, 592 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding that subjec­
tive evaluations made in good faith and based upon the successful candidate's record as 
an employee rebutted plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination). 
144. See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of objective 
and subjective criteria used in decision-making. 
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tible to abuse because of the large amount of discretion they confer 
on the decision maker, there is nothing inherently wrong or unlaw­
ful in using subjective criteria to make employment decisions.145 
Courts have approved the use of subjective criteria that are related 
to the skills demanded by a position and are used fairly as part of a 
reasonably circumscribed procedure.146 Indeed, fairness to both 
the applicant and the employer may require using such criteria be­
cause exclusively using objective criteria might not lead to hiring 
the best person for the position. Subjective criteria such as a per­
son's ability to get along with others and impressions gleaned from 
an interview are criteria that are important in determining if a per­
son is a "fit" for the job in question. Nevertheless, as an evaluation 
becomes less objective, the risk that an employer's use of SUbjective 
criteria masks discriminatory motive increases. 
Courts have reasoned that the risk that subjective criteria is a 
front that permits the employer to discriminate on the basis of age 
is too great to allow the employer to rely on such criteria as a "legit­
imate" reason for adverse employment decisions.147 The concern is 
that an employer would then be able to articulate any vague asser­
tion regarding qualification or experience levels to defeat a plain­
tiff's discrimination claim. Thus, in cases where the employer uses 
only SUbjective criteria upon which to base its adverse employment 
decision, there is an increased risk that the employer is using a 
proxy as a mask for age discrimination, and at the very least, a fac­
tual inference of age discrimination may exist.148 
145. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988) ("[A]n 
employer's policy of leaving promotion decisions to the unchecked discretion of lower 
level supervisors should itself raise no inference of discrinlinatory conduct. "); McKnight 
v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 113-14 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that subjective 
methods of appraising performance are not in and of themselves discriminatory, 
although they are susceptible to discriminatory application); Mallory v. Booth Refriger­
ation Supply Co., 882 F.2d 908, 910 (4th Cir. 1989) (stating that the use of subjective 
criteria, standing alone, does not prove a violation, although the use of subjective crite­
ria is relevant). 
146. See, e.g., Risher v. Aldridge, 889 F.2d 592, 597 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that 
"[ s ]ubjective criteria necessarily and legitimately enter into personnel decisions involv­
ing supervisory positions"); Healy v. New York Life Ins. Co., 860 F.2d 1209, 1220 (3d 
Cir. 1988) (stating that when a company deems a trait essential it has a right to make a 
business decision based on that trait); McCarthney v. Griffin-Spalding County Bd. of 
Educ., 791 F.2d 1549, 1552 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating that "[t]he use of recommendations 
does not, because they are subjective, require [the court] to invalidate the school sys­
tem's promotion procedure"). 
147. See Rowe v. General Motors Co., 457 F.2d 348, 359 (5th Cir. 1972) (analyz­
ing subjective criteria in a Title VII case). 
148. See id. 
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In the three cases discussed in Part II, Taggart,149 Stein/50 and 
Insurance Co. of North America,l51 older applicants were rejected 
because the employers felt that they were overqualified.152 These 
cases suggest that there is a natural correlation between "over­
qualification" and age because older people are likely to have been 
in the workforce longer and have greater work experience. Thus, 
the term overqualified, when used to reject an applicant, can be a 
disguise for a rejection that relies on age.153 However, the court in 
each case reached a different result, suggesting an area of confusion 
in the way courts handle the issue of "overqualification." 
B. Taggart v. Time Inc. 
In Taggart v. Time Inc.,154 the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit acknowledged that the plaintiff made out a prima facie case 
of age discrimination155 and recognized that "overqualification" is 
often correlated with age.156 When the employer was required to 
offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its employment de­
cision, it stated that Taggart was rejected because he was overquali­
fied. 157 As a result, the employer believed that the job would not 
challenge him, and he would likely seek other employment.15s The 
court questioned whether these non-age reasons were the real rea­
sons for rejecting Taggart.159 Significantly, the employer did not of­
fer any objective evidence to support its claim that overqualified 
candidates are likely to seek other employment. In fact, there is 
evidence to the contrary: older workers are often viewed as better 
workers in comparison to workers of any other age category regard­
ing skill, experience, and work ethic, including punctuality, good at­
tendance, and reliability.160 In Taggart, the employer might have 
been able to convince the court that its reason was legitimate and 
nondiscriminatory by producing objective evidence to support its 
149. See supra Part ILA. 
150. See supra Part II.B. 
151. See supra Part II.C. 
152. See supra Part ILA-C for a discussion of these cases. 
153. See supra Part II.A & C for examples of courts that have found that over­
qualified may indeed be a euphemism for age. 
154. 924 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1991). 
155. See id. at 46. 
156. See id. at 47. 
157. See id. See supra Part LB for a discussion of the allocation of burdens in 
discrimination cases. 
158. See id. 
159. See id. at 47-48. 
160. See generally DOWNSIZING IN AN AGING WORK FORCE, supra note 5, at 8-9. 
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subjective claim.161 For example, Time could have tried to show 
that overqualified workers are poor performers, create high turno­
ver, or bear some demonstrable relationship to performance on the 
particular job for which Taggart was being interviewed. However, 
because no such evidence was offered, the court carefully scruti­
nized the employer's stated reason and rejected it.162 
When Congress enacted the ADEA, it was concerned that 
older workers were being deprived of employment on the basis of 
inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes.163 The employer's subjec­
tive reason in Taggart is an example of just such an inaccurate, stig­
matizing, and age-based stereotype that prompted Congress to 
enact the ADEA.164 Thus, the Second Circuit properly scrutinized 
the employer's subjective reasons. Because "overqualification" is 
correlated with age, and because the employer did not offer any 
objective or identifiable evidence to support its claim that actual 
"overqualification" and not age was its reason for not hiring Tag­
gart, the court properly remanded the case to the district court for a 
trial on the merits.165 
C. Stein v. National City Bank 
In Stein v. National City Bank,l66 the Sixth Circuit also recog­
nized that the applicant made out a prima facie case, thus requiring 
the defendant to offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its 
adverse employment action.167 In this case, the employer also re­
jected the applicant based on his "overqualification"; however, the 
161. See supra Part III.A for a discussion of the use of subjective versus objective 
evidence as it applies to legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons offered by employers in 
discrimination claims. 
162. See Taggart, 924 F.2d at 4748. 
163. See supra Part I.A for a discussion of the history of the ADEA. 
164. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993). In Hazen Paper, 
the Supreme Court stated in dicta that (1) disparate treatment "captures the essence of 
what Congress sought to prohibit in the ADEA," and (2) Congress enacted the ADEA 
out of a concern that "older workers were being deprived of employment on the basis 
of inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes." Id. at 610. However, "[w]hen the em­
ployer's decision is wholly motivated by factors other than age, the problem of inaccu­
rate and stigmatizing stereotypes disappears." Id. at 611. (emphasis in original); see also 
EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1080-81 (7th Cir. 1994) (Cudahy, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that disparate impact is a viable theory in age cases, since it is a 
means to detect employment decisions based on inaccurate and stigmatizing 
stereotypes). 
165. See Taggart, 924 F.2d at 48. 
166. 942 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1991). 
167. See id. at 1064-65; see supra Part I.B for a discussion of the allocation of 
burdens in discrimination claims. 
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employer relied on a general policy of not hiring college gradu­
ates.168 The policy was an effort to prevent high turnover rates in 
its customer service representative positions.169 While the use of 
"overqualification," standing alone, is a subjective reason for an ad­
verse employment decision and is carefully scrutinized by the 
courts,17° the employer in Stein utilized an "overqualification" pol­
icy that had objective (i.e., measurable) criteria.l7l The policy of 
not hiring college graduates for certain jobs operated on the reason­
able assumption that persons without college degrees would not be 
as readily employable by a different employer. l72 Hence, both per­
sons under and over the age of forty would be rejected under the 
hiring scheme. Because the employer supported its rejection of the 
plaintiff with an objective measure-whether the applicant had a 
college degree-the Sixth Circuit was able to determine that the 
policy was reasonable and applied in a nondiscriminatory man­
ner.173 The court concluded that the reason proffered by the de­
fendant to reject the older applicant was, in fact, motivated by a 
non-age factor.174 Thus, the employer rightly succeeded in its mo­
tion for summary judgmentP5 
D. EEOC v. Insurance Co. of North America 
Like in Taggart and Stein, the court in EEOC v. Insurance Co. 
of North America,176 recognized that the applicant made out a 
prima facie case of age discrimination. l77 Thus, the employer was 
required to offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its ad­
verse employment decision.178 This employer also offered "over­
168. See Stein, 942 F.2d at 1064. 
169. See id. However, the policy was unwritten and "no statistical study or other 
empirical data supports the assumptions" that it would prevent high turnover. See id. at 
1065. 
170. See, e.g., Binder v. Long Island Lighting Co., 933 F.2d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(stating that "overqualification" policies may "serve as a mask for age discrimination" 
so courts need to make sure that policies are adopted in good faith); Taggart v. Time 
Inc., 924 F.2d 43, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1991) (discussing how "overqualification" policies can 
be used to discriminate based on age). 
171. See Stein, 942 F.2d at 1066. 
172. See id. at 1065. 
173. See id. at 1066. 
174. See id. 
175. See id. 
176. 49 F.3d 1418 (9th Cir. 1995). 
177. See id. at 1419-20. 
178. See id.; see supra Part I.B for a discussion on the allocation of burdens in 
discrimination claims. 
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qualification" as its reason for rejecting the plaintiff.179 The 
employer further explained that it feared "that someone with 
Pugh's extensive background ... would delve too deeply into ... 
assign[ments]."180 The Ninth Circuit held that this was an objective 
and non-age related reason for the rejection and granted summary 
judgment for the employer.181 However, because the employer's 
proffered reason was purely subjective,182 it should have been more 
carefully scrutinized just as the court of appeals did in Taggart. 183 
In contrast to the employer in Stein, ICNA did not maintain an 
objective hiring policy that could justify its subjective reason for not 
hiring Pugh.l84 In addition, the employer failed to offer evidence in 
support of its conclusion that an older worker would "delve too 
deeply" or even to explain how "delving too deeply" would be a 
potential problem.185 Moreover, it is arguable that a younger 
worker who delved deeply into accounts would not be seen in such 
a negative light, but rather would be viewed as aggressive or a po­
tentialleader of the company. Stigmatizing stereotypes that suggest 
that older employees are liabilities rather than assets are precisely 
what the ADEA was enacted to protect against.186 Because the 
employer's conclusions were unsupported by any statistical, empiri­
cal, or otherwise measurable evidence, the rejection based solely on 
"overqualification" was likely a mask for age discrimination. Thus, 
the employer's summary judgment motion should have been de­
feated. Such a result would have allowed the case to proceed to a 
jury which could have then assessed the credibility of the employer. 
Unfortunately for the plaintiff and all older applicants, the Ninth 
Circuit ruled otherwise.187 
E. Suggestion to Employers 
People of all ages often find themselves unemployed. Such a 
change can be both economically and emotionally devastating. 
179. See Insurance Co. of N. Am., 49 F.3d at 1419. 
180. Id. at 1421. 
181. See id. 
182. See supra Part III.A for a discussion of the use of subjective evidence in 
discrimination suits. 
183. See supra Part III.B for a discussion of the Second Circuit's finding in Tag­
gart that "overqualification," by itself, is not a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for 
an adverse employment action. 
184. See supra Part III.C for a discussion of the objective hiring policy in Stein. 
185. See Insurance Co. of N. Am., 49 F.3d at 1421. 
186. See supra Part I.A for a discussion of the purpose of the ADEA. 
187. See Insurance Co. of N. Am., 49 F.3d at 1421. 
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However, the problem is compounded for an older person who has 
been terminated, since the prospect of finding a job in the same 
field of work or at the same managerial level is limited because such 
positions are already filled by long-term employees or because the 
workforce has been reduced.188 In order to remain productive and 
support their families, an older person may be forced to apply for 
any position which is open. 
Employers who are reluctant to hire older people for entry­
level positions based on a belief that they are overqualified not only 
run the risk of violating the ADEA, but also contribute to larger 
societal problems. For instance, a large number of older persons 
who are unable to find work will result in a reduction of both in­
come and confidence for many Americans.189 These problems will 
continue to increase if employers are reluctant to hire older work­
ers because they subjectively believe an applicant is "unqualified" 
simply because the applicant appears to be "overqualified." Thus, 
employers faced with an applicant or employee who they do not 
believe is suited for the position should be cautious about, if not 
avoid entirely, not hiring or promoting that person based upon a 
subjective trait such as "overqualification." 
However, an employer who makes decisions based on an appli­
cant's subjective qualities may take steps to avoid the possibility of 
ADEA litigation. Specifically, if an employer bases employment 
decisions on SUbjective traits, it should set forth in its hiring policy 
all the desired qualities that can only be evaluated subjectively. 
Traits and qualities that require subjective determination should di­
rectly correlate with an applicant or employee's ability to perform 
the job. This serves to demonstrate the legitimacy of the criterion 
at issue by showing that the trait is important to the position. An 
employer should also use objective factors in conjunction with sub­
jective decision-making when hiring, promoting, firing, and taking 
other employment actions. l90 In the event of litigation, the addi­
tional use of objective criteria may reduce the likelihood that a 
188. See DOWNSIZING IN AN AGING WORK FORCE, supra note 5, at 5 n.2. 
189. See id. at 2, 5 n.5 (noting that a Louis and Harris survey, conducted in 1989, 
reported that one million workers aged 50 to 64 believed that they would be forced to 
retire before they were ready). Most of this group, anticipating an unwanted early re­
tirement, said they would prefer to v. ark for years longer. See id. Another Harris sur­
vey, conducted in 1992, found that 5.4 million older Americans, one in seven of those 55 
and older who were not working at that time, were willing to work but could not find a 
suitable job. See id. 
190. See supra Part lILA for a discussion on the appropriateness of using subjec­
tive criteria in employment decision-making. 
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court will find that the employment action was based on age related 
factors. 
An employer should use objective criteria, rather than subjec­
tive criteria, to evaluate whether an applicant is overqualified. If 
possible, the employer should also use objective criteria to deter­
mine the relative qualifications of the individual, which will bolster 
the employer's claim that the applicant was rejected for a legiti­
mate, nondiscriminatory reason, should litigation ensue. If an em­
ployer uses sUbjective criteria, it should maintain a hiring policy 
that indicates the relationship between a worker's subjective traits 
and the position at issue. The hiring policy will help employers de­
fend their use of sUbjective criteria in future litigation by demon­
strating that even thought the sUbjective trait played a role in the 
employment decision, other legitimate factors were also considered. 
CONCLUSION 
The ADEA does not require employers to give preferential 
treatment to older applicants. However, it does require that an 
older applicant, who is equally or more qualified than any other 
applicant, not be denied an equal opportunity in the hiring process 
because of his or her age. While using subjective criteria to make 
employment decisions is not per se unlawful, employers may avoid 
liability if they produce objective and identifiable reasons for their 
employment decisions in order to support their claims that a partic­
ular adverse decision was not based on age. A requirement that 
"overqualification" be supported by objective standards would ad­
vance the policy goals of the ADEA by ensuring that older workers 
receive equal opportunity for jobs, while maintaining an employer's 
ability to seek out and retain the most suitable employees. 
